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Abstract 
Scarf (1960) proposed a market environment and a model of dynamic adjustment
in .which the standard tatonnement price adjustment process orbits around, rather than
converges to, the competitive equilibrium. Hirota ( 1981) characterized the price paths by
the configuration of endowments. We explore the predictions of Scarf's model in a non­
tatonnement experimental double auction. We find that the average transaction prices 
in each period do follow the path predicted by the Scarf and Hirota models. vVhen the 
model predicts prices will converge to the competitive equilibrium, our data converge; 
when the model predicts prices will orbit. our data orbit the equilibrium, and in the 
direction predicted by the model. Moreover. we observe a weak tendency for prices 
within a period to follow the path predicted by the model. 
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1 Introduction1
This paper is motivated by two issues. The first is the nature of the equilibra­
tion process in multiple, interdependent, continuous, double auction markets. 
Not only are such markets in widespread use, their study has been of special 
scientific value. It has been known for years that this particular form of in­
dustrial organization creates an effective price discovery mechanism. Prices 
typically result near the competitive equilibrium. However, exactly how this 
price discovery takes place, the process itself, is unknown. The second moti­
vating issue is the extent to which models based on tatonnement help with 
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understanding this process. Almost all general equilibrium, if not almost. 
all economics, is based on the tatonnement tool. The tool itself was devel­
oped to help theorists abstract from the complexity caused by disequilibrium 
trading patterns. In practice, economic systems are then analyzed as if the 
mechanism of price discovery were tatonnement even when it is obviously 
not. To what extent are tatonnement models reliable when applied in such 
a manner?. Existing experiment.al results suggest that such models are more 
reliable than might be believed. 
A natural way to study the dynamics of price discovery is to focus on sta­
bility, or more specifically, on instability. It is within an unstable system that 
the forces at. work to move prices and quantities are most clearly identifiable. 
The classic paper by Scarf (1960) uses a tatonnement. model to produce some 
striking predictions about the types of behavior a multiple market system 
might exhibit. Using a three commodity example he constructs an exchange 
environment in which price convergence never takes place. Specifically, under 
certain distributions of endowments the prices exhibited by a tat.onnement 
process travel only in closed orbits. Hirota (1981) characterized the price 
movements in terms of endowments. The combined theoretical result is that. 
prices can move in a systematic fashion without equilibration. The direction 
of the orbit can be reversed by a change in the endowments. Or, by simply 
choosing a different. endowment, the t.at.onnement system will converge to the 
competitive equilibrium. 
Curiosity alone demands that. one ask about the type of behavior that 
takes place in an economy such as the one produced by Scarf, even if the 
mechanism is not. t.atonnement. Price movement. without equilibration has 
ll�'n'r before been observed in experiments. In fact., systematic price move­
mmts tend to be inconsistent with bodies of theory that hold that prices 
mnst exist in an arbitrage free configuration. Certainly this is not the case
for au orbit. However, experimental evidence exists that suggests that the 
Scarf environment might. produce unusual behavior. It has been decisively 
demonstrated that. nontatonnement. markets can be unstable.2 That. is, it. is 
2Three concepts of instability have been investigated. The first was the cobweb model, 
\\'hich does not seem to receive empirical support from experiments [Johnson and Plott
( 1989)]. ;-.,rarkets tend to stabilize near the competitive equilibrium even though the 
possibility of a supply lag, with resulting cycles, exists. Two additional concepts of 
stability are found in the literature. The Ivlarshallian concept is based on quantity changes 
and the \\7alrasian concept is based on price changes. The Marshallian concept becomes 
the appropriate model when the markets contain a Marshallian externality [Plott and 
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known that the laws of movement (or attraction) in continuous markets are
such that prices and quantities can move away from an equilibrium. Inter­
estingly enough, the conditions under which such instabilities are observed 
are derived using of a tatonnement model and those conditions are exactly 
when strong income effects exist of the type produced by complements. 
Thus, more than curiosity suggests that one should take a careful look at 
the Scarf world. Instability has been observed under conditions similar to 
those of the Scarf environment and the phenomena are predicted by taton­
nement models. Of course, the Scarf world is a major generalization from 
what has been studied previously, from two commodities to three and from 
simple instability to well defined paths. 
The substance of this paper is that in the Scarf environment a market 
system exhibits properties that can readily be interpreted as having been 
predicted by the Scarf model. An interpretation is required because the 
Scarf model is not developed in operational terms. The paper is divided 
into six sections. In the next section, we briefly introduce the nature of a 
tatonnement model and our adaptation of the Scarf and Hirota model. We 
explain how the design induces unusual equilibrium properties. In doing 
this we use price normalization rather than the unit sphere normalization 
used by Scarf and Hirota. The alternative model is more easily used in 
conjunction with data. In Section 3 we explain our experimental design 
and the treatments we use. Section 4 add;resses some problems with fitting 
differential equations to our data. Section 5 contains the results of our study: 
Section 5 .2 focuses on movement of prices from one period to the next, and 
Section 5 .3 focuses on movement of prices within periods. Finally, Section 6 
summarizes our results. 
Appendix A provides a careful exposition of our adaptation of Scarf's 
model , proving its stability properties under price normalization as opposed 
to the unit sphere normalization. 
George ( 1992)] . The Walrasian concept is the foundation for an appropriate model if the 
preferences have strong income effects [Plott and Smith ( 1999)]. Interestingly, the first 
reported attempt to study the adjustment path of a double auction lead to the rejection 
of the Walrasian model but that early study was incapable of addressing the issue of 
stability and the alternative model accepted in the study has not been generalized to 
multiple markets [Smith ( 1965)]. 
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2 The Nature of Tatonnement
The concept of tatonnement was invented by Walras ( 1874) to address the
problem of disequilibrium trades. Walras was well aware that the equations 
describing a general equilibrium system would be mathematically altered 
with each trade out of equilibrium .. He therefore postulated a price discovery 
system that involves no such trades. In a tatonnement system a disinterested 
auctioneer announces a price Pk in each market k. It is assumed that all
agents in the system respond with optimal quantities given those prices. The 
auctioneer then observes the excess demands, Ek(p) , the quantity demanded
in each market minus the quantity supplied. If the quantity demanded in 
each market is exactly equal to the quantity supplied then the system stops 
and trade takes place at the announced price. If the quantity demanded 
in each market does not equal the quantity supplied in the market then 
no trade takes place and the auctioneer announces a new price. The new 
price announced depends on the excess demands observed. Typically the 
theoretical adjustment process follows a form such as 
(1 )  
In other words, price adjustments are simply proportional to  excess demands, 
Ek(P) ,  where Ak > 0 is a scaling vector . If excess demands are positive the
prices go up, and if supply is greater than demand price goes down. As 
indicated by the formula, if excess demands are zero then prices do not 
change; the system has attained equilibrium. 
It is important to notice that time is continuous in the model. Prices 
are moving continuously in response to the excess demand at each instant. 
By contrast, actual market activities take place in discrete instances in real 
time. Typically, in a double auction bids and asks are tendered in real time 
according to the decision of agents, as are accepted bids and offers . After 
a period 'in which trading takes place in an experiment the markets close 
and profits are allocated. Then, parameters are reset and the experience is 
repeated, similar to a series of trading days, each like the one before. Thus, a 
substantial disconnect exists between the concept of time in the tatonnement 
model and the timing of events in an actual market. 
The markets we create have a period structure where endowments are re­
stored at the beginning of each period. Trading takes place within a period 
and those trades can be at different prices, depending on the bids and asks 
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and pattern of acceptances. Thus, there are within-period shifts in holdings 
which could cause deviations from predicted price adjustment paths. On 
the other hand, the period-to-period activity can reflect beliefs of the market 
agents acquired by previous trades and by the trading activity of others. In 
the analysis that follows price movements within periods and also across pe­
riods price movements will be studied. As it turns out ,  it is the across period 
price movements that are most accurately captured by the Scarf model. 
2 .1 Theoretical Model 
In Scarf's formulation of a nonconvergent economy, the assignment of en­
dowments can be manipulated so that the Walrasian tatonnement dynamic 
predicts clockwise orbits, counterclockwise orbits, or a globally stable com­
petitive equilibrium. 
In the economy we study, there are three commodities , X, Y and Z.
The total amount of each commodity in the economy is given by Wx, wy 
and Wz. There are three types of agents, each type desiring a pair of com­
modities as perfect complements: type 1 does not want the first commodity 
and has a utility function proportional to min{y/wy , z/wz}; type 2 does
not want the second commodity and has a utility function proportional to 
min{ x/wx, z/wz}; and type 3 does not want commodity 3 and has a utility
function proportional to min{x/wx, y/wy}· 
There are two specifications of the price adjustment process proposed by 
Scarf. In Scarf's original case, prices move proportional to excess demand, 
which we will call the Absolute Price Adjustment model. In a specification 
frequently used in macroeconomics, the derivative is scaled by the price level. 
We will call this second specification the Price-Scaled Adjustment model. 
Both models will be reviewed in the two major sections below. 
2.2 Absolute Price Adjustment 
The Walrasian price adjustment process assumes that prices move propor­
tional to excess demands. Appendix A.1 demonstrates that, given these 
utility functions, and the price normalization as opposed to the unit sphere 
normalization, the absolute price adjustment process is described by the dif­
ferential equations 
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(2) 
(3) 
where Mi is the value of the endowment of an agent of type i at current prices .
From any initial. price (Px(O),py (O)), this system prescribes the sequence of
prices which would be called out by the Walrasian auctioneer. 
Figure la shows convergent price adjustment paths from a few initial 
price pairs and Ax = Ay = 1. Note that each path approaches the Walrasian
equilibrium, but not always in a straight line. Appendix A.2.2 proves this 
system of equations is globally stable if each agent is endowed with all of the 
commodity (s)he does not want . 
Figure lb shows examples of orbits paths for two different values of A, 
and Figure le projects an orbit into price-time space. 
Appendix A.2.1 shows that if the agents are each endowed with all of 
exactly one of the commodities she desires, Equations 2 and 3 prescribe a 
stable center. A stable center is an adjustment pattern where, if the price 
starts at the equilibrium, the system will stay there. However, if the starting 
price is not the equilibrium, prices will move around the equilibrium in a 
closed orbit. 
2.2.1 Liapunov Function 
Assessing the stability of a system of differential equations requires determin­
ing whether or not prices are getting "closer" to the equilibrium over time. 
A Liapunov function provides the appropriate notion of distance by which to 
determine whether prices are getting closer to the equilibrium over time. If 
the derivative of the Liapunov function is negative, the system is converging; 
if it is positive, the system is diverging; if it is zero, the system is moving in 
closed orbits . 
The different treatments in this experiment are analyzed using different 
Liapunov functions.3 In Appendix A.2 .1 , it is shown that, for the orbiting 
treatments, the system of Equations 2 and 3 can be integrated explicitly, 
3We were unable to identify a Liapunov function which applies to both the convergent 
and orbiting treatments. 
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giving a function for the closed orbits around the equilibrium in which prices 
move. The function takes on a constant value everywhere on the orbit, with 
higher values further from the equilibrium. This function can be normalized 
by having the equilibrium value of the function subtracted to give a function 
with value zero at.equilibrium; this normalized version is a Liapunov function 
for the orbiting treatments. 
For notational compactness, write 
where (p; , p;) is the equilibrium price pair. Then the Liapunov function for
the orbiting treatments is given by 
(5) 
Appendix A.2 .2 derives a Liapunov function for the convergent cases. For 
notational compactness, write 
Then 
1 1 
V(px (t) , py(t)) = >-x 
X + Ay 
Y
is a Liapunov function for the system of Equations 2 and 3 .  
2.3 Price-scaled Price Adjustment 
(6) 
(7) 
An alternative specification of the price adjustment process hold that prices 
move proportional to excess demands , but scaled by the price level. In this 
case, the price adjustment process is described by the differential equations 
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� = Ax [WxM2(Px,Py) + WxM3(Px,Py) _ Wx] 
Px PxWx + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
� = Ay [wyM1(Px,Py) + WyM3(Px , Py) _ Wyl 
Py PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
(8) 
(9) 
where Mi is the value of the endowment of an agent of type i at current
prices . This system is interpreted exactly as Equations 2 and 3.
Appendix A.3 .2 proves this system of equations is globally stable if each 
agent is endowed with all of the commodity she does not want . 
Appendix A.3 . 1 shows that if the agents are each endowed with all of 
exactly one of the commodities she desires , Equations 2 and 3 prescribe a 
stable center. 
2.3.1 Liapunov Function 
The stability of this system can also be analyzed using a Liapunov function. 
As with the absolute model, a different Liapunov function is used for the 
convergent and orbiting treatments. 
Appendix A.3 . 1 shows how the system of Equations 8 and 9 can be in­
tegrated to give a function for the orbits in which prices move. Like in the 
absolute model, this function can be translated so it takes on the value zero 
at equilibrium and larger values further from equilibrium. For notational 
compactness write 
x ( 10)
y
where (p;, p;) is the equilibrium price pair. Then the Liapunov function for
the orbiting treatments is given by 
( 1 1 )
Appendix A.3 .2 derives a Liapunov function for the convergent treatment . 
For notational compactness, write 
X = Wx[ ( -2
1
Px (t)2 - (
Wz
)2 l n (px (t) ) ) - (�(p;)2 - (
Wz
)2 l n (p;) )J ( 12)Wx 2 Wx 
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Then 
1 1 
V(Px (t) , py (t) )  = ,x + ;:-YAx y 
is the Liapunov function for the convergent treatment. 
3 Experimental Design
( 13) 
The parameters used in the experiments are in Table 1. Two elements of the 
Scarf and Hirota model's predictions are the focus of the research. First , do 
prices orbit when the model predicts they will orbit and do prices converge 
when the model predicts they will converge? Second, if orbits are observed, 
do prices move along the orbits in the direction the model predicts? To 
answer these questions three treatments outlined in Table 1 are used. 
In all treatments the competitive equilibrium is the same but the dynam­
ics predicted by the model differ. Agents are of three types. Preferences 
and endowments for each type are listed for each treatment. Each agent is 
endowed only with one of the items that contributes to the agent's payoff. 
For example, under Treatment I ,  Type 1 people like Y and Z, and are all en­
dowed with 20 units of Y. Under the endowments listed as Treatment I the 
model predicts counter clockwise price orbits. Clockwise orbits are predicted 
under Treatment II. Price convergence is predicted for Treatment III. The 
table also lists the equilibrium values that are the same for all treatments. 
The sequence of experimental conditions are in Table 2. Experiments 
. included five agents of each type, for a total of 15 subjects in each experiment. 
We ran experiments in Caltech 's Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science between July, 1998 and May, 1999. Subjects were Caltech 
undergraduate and graduate students, many of whom nad participated in 
unrelated experiments, but who did not necessarily have any training in 
economics. No subject participated in more than one of the inexperienced 
trials. 
Trading was conducted using MUDA, a standard software for conducting 
experimental multiple unit double auction markets . Types were assigned to 
computers prior to subjects' entering the laboratory, and subjects selected 
a computer (with its monitor off) when they arrived; type assignment was 
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effectively random. Subject payments averaged $29, with a range of $21 to 
$35 for a three hour experiment . 
At the beginning of each experiment the instructions in Appendix B were 
read aloud, and the MUDA software was explained to the subjects. There was 
then a practice trading period for subjects to get used to the software. Then 
payoff tables inducing preferences were passed out and the first trading period 
then began. In the inexperienced sessions, the first period was 1 5  minutes 
long, the second, third and fourth were 12 minutes long, and the remaining 
periods were each ten minutes long. In the experienced sessions, the first 
period was 12 minutes long, the second, third and fourth were ten minutes 
long and the remaining periods were eight minutes long. The inexperienced 
sessions had between eight and 1 1  periods, and the experienced sessions 
lasted 15 or 16 periods. 
4 Econometric Methodology and Data Anal-
. ys1s 
The experiments provide two kinds of data, transaction by transaction data 
and period average prices. When using average period prices the concept of 
a price pair at an instant of time, t, has a natural interpretation as the pair 
of average prices that exist in a period. That is, the average X transaction 
price in a period with the average Y transaction price in the same period 
to generate observations in (Px , Py)-space. We analyze this period-to-period 
data using Liapunov functions, as well as numerical solutions to Equations 
2 and 3 .  
The raw, transaction by transaction data are separate time series of X
transaction prices and Y transaction prices. Because transactions in the two 
markets do not take place at the same time, these series are not synchronized. 
That is, vye do not have observations in the (Px , Py)-space in which the theory 
makes predictions . We make an assumption to synchronize the two markets 
and analyze the transformed data using Liapunov functions. 
4.1 Fitting the Liapunov Function 
As discussed above, the Liapunov function can be used to determine whether 
or not prices are converging. The Liapunov functions for the convergent 
and unstable treatments under both the Absolute Price Adjustment and the 
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Price-Scaled Adjustment model specifications of the price adjustment process 
can be expressed as 
(14) 
where Ax and Ay are unknown parameters of the system. The analytical 
derivatives of this function can be studied to determ'ine the analytical sta­
bility properties of the system. To determine whether or not the data are 
converging, the evolution of the value of the function at observed price pairs 
can be studied. Specifically, to determine if prices are getting closer to an 
equilibrium we would like to be able to use the model 
(15) 
where f3 is a notion of the derivative of the data: a positive f3 corresponds 
to divergence, a negative f3 to convergence, and a f3 not distinguishable from 
zero to orbiting. Unfortunately, this model is complicated by the unknown 
parameters, Ax and Ay , in the Liapunov function. 
To solve this problem we estimate the following model, 
Y = lo + 11 ( -X) + 12t (16)
where lo = Ay · a is the constant, 11 = Ay/ Ax and 12 = Ay · (3. It is not aconcern that we cannot identify coefficients separate from Ay : Ax , Ay and the 
constant are nuisance parameters , and we care only about the sign of (3, not 
its value. Because Scarf's model requires that the Aks be strictly positive, 
we can infer that the sign of 12 is the sign of (3.4 Therefore, we can testwhether or not our data are converging by testing whether 12 is significantlypositive (diverging) , negative (converging) or neither (orbiting) . The t data, 
either the trade number for the trade-to-trade data or period number for 
the period-to-period data, is normalized to range between zero and one by 
dividing each t by the largest value it takes on within a period or within an 
experiment respectively. This means the lo can be interpreted as the initial
value of the Liapunov function and lo + 12 is the value of the Liapunovfunction at the end of the series. 
4We do not explicitly impose this restriction in our estimation. 
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4.2 Fitting Numerical Solutions 
While the model specified in the previous section is simple, we do lose some 
information looking only at the analytical solution to Equations 2 and 3 .  
The Liapunov functions do not capture the different predictions of the clock­
wise and counterclockwise treatments. This problem can be overcome by 
considering numerical solutions to the system of differential equations .  
The numerical solution model has four parameters, a Px starting point , a
Py starting point, a Ax/ Ay ratio,5 and an amount of abstract time, T. This
abstract time parameterizes the path along which prices evolve; it is the time 
with respect to which the differential equations are specified.  T is the amount 
of this time which transpires during a period.6 For instance, if an orbit had 
a period of t = 10 and the data were explained by half of that orbit , then
T would be estimated to equal 5. We estimate the starting points because 
forcing the data to start at the first point could unfairly penalize a model on 
data with an outlier first period; the model above implicitly allows for this 
by using all the data points. 
These four parameters identify a portion of a path with a particular shape 
and starting point. Predictions for successive periods are taken to be evenly 
spaced, in t, along the path. Simulated annealing is used to identify the com­
bination of parameters which maximizes the likelihood of the simultaneous 
Px and Py errors under a bivariate normal distribution. 
The direction of the path along an orbit is indicated by the sign of T. If 
T is positive, T > 0, then the path is counterclockwise. If T is negative,
T < 0, then the direction is clockwise. This feature is central to the testing.
4.3 A Straight-Line 
The model in Section 4.2 does not have a naturally nested alternative model, 
in either the orbiting or convergent treatments. To gauge how well it is 
performing, we compare it to a model that predicts that price will follow a 
straight line from the starting point to the competitive equilibrium. In the 
convergent treatments both models predict convergence, but along slightly 
different paths. 
5The parameters Ax and >.y cannot be identified in price space. 
6The time T bears no relation (one that we understand, anyway) to either the amount
of clock time that has passed during the experiment or the number of trades that have 
occurred, two frequently used measures of time in experimental market analysis . 
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The objective function for the straight line model is the same as in Sec­
tion 4.2, but the predictions are generated along a straight line. We define 
T = 0 at the starting point and T = 1 at equilibrium. Thus, if the data
actually converge, we would expect to see T estimated about 1 .  If T > 1 ,
the prediction overshoots the equilibrium; if T < 0 ,  it is moving away from
equilibrium, and if 0 < T < 1 ,  then the data move along the path toward
equilibrium, but do reach it. We can compare the relative likelihoods, using 
standard techniques to account for the difference in the number of parame­
ters, to determine :which of the two models explain the data better. 
5 Results
5.1 Data Overview 
Figure 2 presents the time series of contract prices of the 4/12/99conv and 
5/19/99ccw sessions. The time series of X prices and equilibrium are indi­
cated in grey, and the time series for Y is in black. The convergent session's 
time series of 4/12/99conv has features common to standard double auction 
markets. The market prices start away from equilibrium and move slowly 
toward it . Importantly, they rarely cross over the equilibrium price for their 
respective market, and never for more than a fraction of a period. 
This is not the case for the counterclockwise session of 5/19/99. Several 
times, in periods 3 and 12 in the X market and periods 7 and 14 in the Y mar­
ket, the time series of prices passes through the equilibrium value and moves 
away from equilibrium for several periods. In simple markets with standard 
preferences, passing through the equilibrium price seldom occurs and when 
it does, the overshooting quickly corrects itself. The sustained movements 
away from equilibrium in this experiment suggests there is something very 
unusual about the Scarf environment. 
That important features of these data are captured by the Scarf model is 
most apparent in (Px , Py)-space when dealing with average period prices . Fig­
ures 3 ,  4 and 5 present average price per period data from the counterclock­
wise, clockwise and convergent treatments respectively. Each experiment 's 
first period average price is labeled with the experiment's date, and consec­
utive periods are connected with lines. Following lines away from the dated 
starting point gives an idea of how prices moved during the experiment . 
These data have three important features that we interpret as predicted 
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by the Scarf model. First , convergence occurs in the convergent treatment , 
but not in the clockwise and counterclockwise treatments. Thus, the Scarf 
model is an accurate indicator of whether or not the market will converge. 
Second , in the nonconvergent treatments, data appear to be systematically 
orbiting the equilibrium rather than moving randomly about the price space, 
so the model accurately predicts the nature of the nonconvergent behavior. 
Finally, when we do observe orbits , the movement is in the direction (clock­
wise or counterclockwise) predicted by the model.
In the counterclockwise treatment shown in Figure 3, the Scarf model
predicts that prices should move counterclockwise around the equilibrium, 
and not converge. The 7 /13/98, 11/24/98, 1/12/99, 2/19/99 and 5/11/99 
experiments all clearly move in the counterclockwise direction from their 
starting points; the one experiment which does not is 1/22/99, which does not 
really move anywhere. Furthermore, the 7 /13/98, 11/24/98, 1/12/99, and
5/11/99 experiments do not move noticeably closer to the equilibrium in later 
periods, instead appearing to move in closed orbits around the equilibrium. 
Even the 2/19/99 experiment, which does eventually converge, begins by 
moving away from equilibrium along a counterclockwise path. 
In the clockwise treatment, both experiments move clockwise from their 
starting points. Moreover, both time series pass through an equilibrium 
price in at least one market , a move away from equilibrium consistent with 
orbiting behavior . In this treatment, too, the data are consistent with the 
Scarf model 's prediction of the existence of an orbit and its direction. 
Both experiments in the convergent treatment begin away from the equi­
librium and move toward it , but there are important details to notice about 
the convergence path in relation to the model. The Scarf model predicts that , 
�f Px begins below 40 , then Py will drop below 20 and rise as Py approaches 
equilibrium. The time series reflect this detail of the predicted convergence 
path: the 4/14/99 experiment starts with Py > 20 ,  but Py drops below the
equilibrium price as Px increases until both rise to meet the equilibrium; in 
4/12/99, Py begins below 20 , but it drops further below 20 before rising to
approach the equilibrium. 
The remainder of this section attempts to summarize these pictures sta­
tistically. 
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5.2 Statement of Results: Average Period Prices 
The first result tells us that the impression gained from the figures is correct 
with respect to the conditions under which convergence is observed. 
Result 1 When the Scarf model predicts nonconvergence, we observe non­
convergence; when the Scarf model predicts convergence, we observe conver­
gence. 
Support: Table 3 presents the least squares estimates of Equation 16 ,  
corrected for first-order serially correlated residuals using the Prais-Winsten 
algorithm, and White-corrected standard errors.7 In six of the eight orbiting 
treatments, the hypothesis that f3 = 0 is not rejected in either specification.
This means that the value of the Liapunov function is not changing over time, 
suggesting that the data are orbiting the Walrasian equilibrium in these six 
cases. Perhaps surprisingly, this is also true of 2/19/99ccw, which actually 
does converge. This suggests that the many periods moving away from the 
equilibrium as if along an orbit is of greater importance than the few periods' 
(possibly random) movement toward equilibrium. 
The remaining two cases do not provide strong evidence against the Scarf 
model, however. In 1 1/24/99ccw, /3 is estimated to be significantly positive
in both specifications, consistent with divergence, as opposed to convergence. 
Looking at the 1 1/24/99ccw time series in Figure 3a, the first periods appear 
to be on a very round orbit , while the latter periods appear to be following 
a much flatter one. Since the linear model estimates a A ratio between the 
high Ay/ Ax ratio which would appear to fit the first periods well and the low 
Ay/ Axratio which would fit the last few periods best . The net result is that, 
f?r any fixed A ratio, the data are moving from orbits which are close to 
equilibrium to those which are further away; this is divergence. 
In the other experiment where Scarf's model predicts orbiting, 4/19/99cw, 
f3 is significantly less than zero in both specifications, consistent with con­
vergence. Looking at the time series in Figure 4 ,  this data does not provide 
strong support for convergence. The time series begins very close to the 
equilibrium, and remains close; the fit of this data is driven by random fluc­
tuations in the data. This explanation is reinforced by the rejection of the 
maintained hypothesis that Ay/ Ax is positive in this regression. 
7The reported R2 compare the model variance with a constant only model. However, a
constant-only model is not nested in the Prais-Winsten transformed data. Therefore, the 
R2 can be less than zero ( *).
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The maintained hypothesis that >.y/ Ax > 0 is statistically rejected , by
both specifications, in one other experiment , 1/22/99ccw. Looking at the 
time series in Figure 3b reveals that this experiment began close to the equi­
librium and made no systematic move toward or away from it . 
, Therefore, of the eight experiments in which Scarf's model predicts or­
biting, in none is there a tendency toward convergence: two begin close to 
equilibrium and remain there, one diverges, and five move in clear orbits 
around the equilibrium. 
Scarf's model predicts convergence in two experiments. In one, 4/12/99conv, 
/3 is significantly less than zero in both specifications. This means that the 
value of the Liapunov function is decreasing over time, consistent with con­
vergence. In the other, 4/14/99conv, /3 is not significantly different from 
zero. 
A closer look at the predicted paths suggests that we should not be sur­
prised that the convergent datasets did not get closer to equilibrium. The 
equilibrium is reached only in the limit , but the limit is approached very 
slowly. If we imagine the Walrasian auctioneer making one adjustment per 
period of abstract time, we can get some sense of the slowness predicted by 
numerically solving the Equations 2 and 3. If the starting point is ( 15 ,25) , 
then the prices are (24.988, 18 .660) after two adjustments, (39. 1 13 , 19.736) 
after 16, (39.946, 19.983) after 32 and (39.954,19.985) after 64. At this point , 
adjustments are so small that they exceed machine precision, suggesting that 
the remaining approach is very difficult . One can imagine that , in the dis­
cretized price space of this experiment , this difficulty in approaching equilib­
rium would be reflected by data making lots of small jumps near the equi­
librium but never reaching it. Looking at Figure 5, this is exactly what the 
convergent treatment data look like. They start away from the equilibrium, 
quickly move closer, but getting within two units is very difficult, as prices 
vibrate short of the equilibrium, without ever getting there or overshooting. 
This vibration causes the sign of the derivative to fluctuate, although move­
ments are small . These fluctuations lead to ambiguous results, although the 
pictures clearly indicate the data are converging. 
Overall, these data suggest that Scarf's model provides considerable lever­
age on whether or not a non-tatonnement market system is going to converge. 
In the orbiting treatments, none of the eight experiments are clearly converg­
ing as the model predicts. In the convergent treatment, one of the experi­
ments clearly converges, while the other begins close to the equilibrium and 
remains there without approaching it. Taken together , these results suggest 
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that Scarf's model of tatonnement price adjustment can shed light on the 
convergence properties of a market system, even with a non-tatonnement 
market mechanism. 
Having established that the data from the orbiting treatment are in fact_ 
orbiting the equilibrium, the next question is whether or not the direction of 
the orbits is the direction predicted, Because the Liapunov function does not 
provide information about the direction of an orbit, we must use a different 
model to determine whether the movement along the orbits is in the direction 
predicted by the Scarf model. To test the direction the data are moving, we 
numerically integrate Equations 2 and 3 in the way discussed in Section 4. 2. 
Table 4 presents maximum likelihood estimates and goodness of fit statis­
tics for the numerically solved Scarf model and the straight line model. To 
help compare models, two statistics are presented, the Akaike information cri­
terion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) . 8  These statistics 
can be compared directly and used for model calibration; they are designed 
to reach a maximum value at an optimal tradeoff between improvement of fit 
and additional parameters, even when models are non-nested as is the case 
here. 
The first thing to note is that these estimates are consistent with the 
previous two results. In the orbiting treatments, the AIC selects the Scarf 
model over the straight line model in every experiment ; the BIC selects the 
Scarf model in all but the 4/19/99cw experiment. This suggests that the 
data are better predicted by an orbiting path than one which converges. 
Are the orbiting cases going in the right direction? Having confirmed that 
the data are in fact orbiting the equilibrium, the next question is whether or 
not the direction of the orbits is the direction predicted by the Scarf model. 
Result 2 The directions of the orbits are as predicted by the Scarf model. 
Support: The Scarf model estimated in Table 4 predicts that T should be 
positive iri the the counterclockwise treatments and negative in the clockwise 
8The AIC is the total in-sample log-likelihood minus the number of model parameters. 
It is widely used for model comparison, but not motivated by any optimality considera­
tions. The BIC is the total in-sample log-likelihood minus the half the number of model 
parameters times the natural log of the number of observations .  The BIC can be inter­
preted as follows: if model i has a higher BIC than j, then exp{-(BIC; - BICj)} is an 
approximation to the posterior odds ratio , Pr(i)/Pr(j), of a Bayesian observer with equal 
priors (Carlin and'Louis, 1996) .  
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treatments. The estimates bear this out, as every experiment is consistent 
with this prediction. 
Are the particular paths of the convergent cases consistent with the Scarf 
model? Having established that the data from the convergent treatments 
are actually converging, we can now ask a more precise question about how 
they are converging: are they converging_ along a simple straight line path, 
or are they following exactly the path predicted by-the Scarf model? 
Result 3 The Scarf model predicts better than a straight-line convergence 
model in the convergent case. 
Support: The evidence from Table 4 points weakly to the paths pre­
dicted by the Scarf model . The AIC selects the Scarf model in both con­
vergent experiments, but the BIC, the stronger of the criteria, selects the 
straight line model in the 4/14/99conv experiment. This is not surprising 
because the 4/14/99conv data do not converge strongly. Taken together, 
these estimates suggest that our data not only converge, but they follow the 
indirect path prescribed by the Scarf model rather than a direct path to the 
equilibrium. 
5.3 Within-Period Price Adjustments 
The results in the previous section examined the movement of the mean trade 
prices in each period. The section concluded that the period-to-period path 
was well-predicted by the Scarf model. The next natural question is whether 
or not the Scarf model predicts trade-to-trade price movements within a 
period. 
In general , this is an exceptionally difficult question to answer. The 
primary reason is that trade-to-trade data are not observed in the same 
space as the model makes predictions . The Scarf model makes predictions 
about comovements in (Px, py)-space, but we typically only observe a trade
in one market at a time. This means that when we observe a trade in the X
market at Px, we do not know what the corresponding Py is, and therefore 
cannot calculate excess demand or formulate a prediction from the Scarf 
model, without special assumptions. 
To generate price pairs, we assume that the price in the inactive market is 
equal to the price of the last trade in the market ; for instance, if we observe 
an X trade at Px, we assume the corresponding Py is the price at which Y
last traded, although it did not in fact occur contemporaneously. 
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Result 4 Trade-to-trade price paths are not consistent with the Scarf model. 
Support: Table 5 presents the Prais-Winsten estimates of Equation 16, 
corrected for first-order serially correlated residuals, and White-corrected 
standard errors. . In neither of the experiments for which the Scarf model 
predicts convergence do the trade-to-trade data give evidence of convergence. 
For the 4/12/99conv the f3 suggests divergence and· for the 4/14/99conv the
f3 is not significantly different from zero for either specification, suggesting 
an orbit. In th� experiments in which Scarf's model predicts orbiting, both 
specifications conclude that six are orbiting and two are diverging. 
Without a compelling distinction between the orbiting and convergent 
treatments, these data do not support the predictions of Scarf's model in 
the trade-to-trade price paths. However, the fact that orbiting is observed 
suggests that a closer look at the convergent cases might be productive. One 
wonders if different methods of dealing with the data might reveal conver­
gence in those cases in which the model suggests that convergence will take 
place. In particular, the study of Figure 2a suggests that the reason that the 
model shows little support for the convergent cases is because in the later 
periods prices begin a period so close to the equilibrium that there is little 
room for further movement. Thus, the model does not reflect movement 
toward the equilibrium in the convergent cases because in the later periods 
there is little movement at all. This beginning is followed by some rather 
large " spikes" near the end of a period. However, for now we must leave 
the question as a paradox, perhaps to be answered by different econometric 
methodology. 
6 Summary of Conclusions
The conclusions are easy to state. The Scarf model does a surprisingly good 
job of predicting features of the markets we created. The Scarf model is a 
type of idealized adjustment process in which disequilibrium trades do not 
take place and prices change in the smooth fashion described by a continuous 
tatonnement process. By contrast , the markets we study are characterized 
by bids, asks, and trades that take place at prices that jump around from 
trade to trade. Clearly the assumptions of the idealized tatonnement model 
are not satisfied by our markets . Nevertheless , a correspondence between 
the predictions of the model and the actual market behavior is there. 
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When the Scarf model predicts convergence to the competitive equilib­
rium the markets are observed converging across periods. When the model 
predicts that prices will move in counterclockwise orbits, such orbits are ob­
served in the period to period average prices. When the model predicts that 
the prices will move in clockwise orbits, again, the period to period average 
·prices tend to move in that direction.
Looking for similar results for within-period price adjustments is consid­
erably more difficult because we do not observe points in (px ,Py )-space. The 
timing of trades is not simultaneous in our markets, so price pairs are not 
observed unless additional assumptions are made. Therefore, our results in 
the within-period domain are statistically weaker, and provide little support 
for Scarf-like movement on trade-to-trade price paths . 
Obviously, the ability of the tatonnement model to predict prominent 
features of market behavior under circumstances in which it was generally 
believed to be inapplicable calls for some theoretical speculation. Among pe­
riods, the endowments are refreshed, so prices (or expectations about prices 
based on history) can evolve separate from endowments. Across periods 
expectations might act much like a tatonnement mechanism. On the other 
hand, within periods, holdings change as trades are made, meaning this en­
vironment is missing a critical feature of the tatonnement mechanism. These 
data suggest the Scarf model does not explain these price paths, so exactly 
what explains these adjustments remains a mystery, and an excellent avenue 
for future research. 
The exercise forcefully exhibits a major conclusion. Markets are sub­
ject to laws of adjustment . There is a process of movement that may not 
involve a stationary state and the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Our 
. understanding of the price discovery process should focus on the nature of 
those laws. This research suggests that the classical tatonnement tool may 
be more useful in understanding these laws than was previously believed . 
Of course, the implications of the results are at this point only a subject 
for speculation. In a sense , the Scarf example suggests that if the Samuelso­
nian dynamic exists in markets, then general equilibrium must be concerned 
about stability. That is clearly the case given the data produced so far. Ob­
viously, additional market instruments, such as options, or other instruments 
that help remove arbitrage possibilities from time paths might serve to in­
duce stability and convergence. But, those issues are matters for further 
research. 
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Type utype(x, y, z) Endowment ( w�, w�, w� )
Treatment I: Counterclockwise orbits 
1 40 min{y/20, z/400} (0, 20, 0) 
2 40 min{x/10, z/400} (0, 0, 400) 
3 40 min{ x/10, y/20} ( 10, 0, 0) 
Treatment II: Clockwise orbits 
1 40 min{y/20, z/400} (0, 0, 400) 
2 40 min{x/10, z/400} ( 10, 0, 0) 
3 40 min{x/10, y/20} (0, 20, 0) 
Treatment III: Globally Stable 
1 40 min{y/20, z/400} (10 ,  0 ,  0) 
2 40 min{x/10,z/400} (0, 20, 0) 
3 40 min{x/10, y/20} (0, 0,400) 
Equilibrium Values 
1 $2.50 (U=20) (0, 10, 200) 
2 $2. 50 (U=20) (5,0,200) 
3 $2.50 (U=20) (5 , 10,0) 
Table 1 :  Utility functions and endowments for each type of agent for the 
three treatments. 
Treatment Date Periods Experienced 
I. Counter- 7/13/98 8 No 
clockwise 1 1/24/98 10 No 
(ccw) 1/12/99 10 No 
1/22/99 10 No 
2/19/22 16 Yes 
5/11/99 15 Yes 
II. Clockwise 4/19/99 10 No 
(cw) 4/20/99 10 No 
III . Convergent 4/12/99 11  No 
(conv) 4/14/99 11  No 
Table 2: The treatment , date, level of experience and number of periods for 
each session. 
21 
Absolute p Relative p/p 
>.y. (3 ).. · a y Ay. (3 ).. . ay 
>.y/>.x Period Constant R2 >.y/>.x Period Constant R2
7 /13/98ccw 0 .12 87.37 175 .86 0.936 0 . 76 7.41 16. 14 0.915 
4.50 1 .49 17.62 4 .24 1 . 22 16 .20 
1 1/24/98ccw 0.05 279.37 151 .29 0.898 0 .47 10 .26 26.48 0.951 
6.63 4.63 6.68 1 1 .33 2 .60 15 .84 
1/12/99ccw -0.01 -6.64 18.18 * 0 .02 -0. 10 0.84 * 
-0. 17 -0.25 1 . 22 0.27 -0.08 1 .47 
1/22/99ccw -0 .12 1 .34 -4. 12 0.558 -0.35 0 . 10 -0 .29 0.533
-2 .20 0 .24 -0.68 -2 .05 0.29 -0.76 
2/19/99ccw -0.06 6.60 7.39 0.026 -0. 14 0.22 0.30 0. 038
-0.89 0 .19 0 .94 -0 .96 0 . 17 1 .06 
5/1 1/99ccw 0.20 12 .44 74. 12 0.354 0.49 -0. 19 4.66 0.561 
3 .70 0 .19 1 . 77 4 . 74 -0. 12 3.39 
4/19/99cw -1 .23 -39 . 13 24.01 0.672 -1 .9 1  - 1 .58 1 .01 0 .703 
-2.08 -3 .50 3 .08 -2 .40 -3.66 3 . 19 
4/20/99cw 0.04 0.98 121 .83 * 0 . 1 1 -0.55 4.31 * 
0.44 0.01 0 .96 1 . 13 -0. 10 1 . 22 
4/12/99conv 0.04 -5639.5 5327.24 0.458 0 .06 -313. 79 293.55 0 .459 
1 .98 -3 .38 3.84 1 .98 -3.42 3 .86 
4/14/99conv -0.00 2439.43 1 183.63 0. 171 0 .02 146.31  64.27 0 .215 
-0.03 1 .07 0.74 0 . 12  1 . 1 1  0.71 
Table 3 :  . Prais-Winsten least squares estimates of the Liapunov function 
model in Equation 16 on period-to-period data. The t-statistics are pre-
sented below each estimate. 
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LL Px(O) Py (O) Ax/ >.y T AIC BIC 
Scarf Model 
7 /13/98ccw -38. 77 16.87 10.08 5 .84 7.29 -45. 77 -46.05 
1 1/24/98ccw -70.77 3 .63 25.38 457.44 2 .25 -77. 77 -78.83 
1/12/99ccw -44.22 43.67 15 .67 16 .93 9 .97 -51 .22 -52.27 
1/22/99ccw -37.94 50. 77 18. 12  521 . 75 20.92 -44.94 -46.00 
2/19/99ccw -80.23 42.95 19 .54 1301 .20 22.50 -87. 23 -89.94 
5/1 1/99ccw -68.79 23.46 14.87 4 .63 23. 18 -75 . 79 -78.26
4/19/99cw -39 .29 39.20 23.59 0.53 -20. 1 1  -46.29 -47.68 
4/20/99cw -61 .41 23.22 23.07 2 . 18 -24.47 -68.41 -69.80 
4/12/99conv -38.89 28.99 20.26 1040.47 81 .01  -45 .89 -47.28 
4/14/99conv -40.39 35 .23 21 .97 0.08 15 . 19 -47.39 -48. 78
Straight-line Model 
7 /13/98ccw -53.07 3 1 .02 21 .35 6 .85 -60.07 -59.30 
1 1/24/98ccw -82.04 0.00 18.57 . 3 . 72 -89.04 -88.95 
1/12/99ccw -59 . 10 52 .76 18.91 2 .36 -66 . 10  -66.01 
1/22/99ccw -39. 54 49.08 18. 15 0 . 16 -46 .54 -46 .45 
2/19/99ccw -92.55 56.00 23.82 0 .99 -99.55 - 100.87 
5/1 1/99ccw -106.66 50.37 12.29 1 .86 -1 13.66 -114 .78 
4/19/99cw -40 .15 40.07 24.99 0 .74 -47. 1 5  -47.35 
4/20/99cw -76.49 19 .08 20.38 1 .99 -83.49 -83.68 
4/12/99conv -40.43 27.61 17.00 0.93 -47.43 -47.62 
4/14/99conv -41 . 16 36.98 18.61 -0.38 -48. 16 -48.35 
Table 4: Parameter estimates and goodness of fit statistics for the numerical 
Scarf model and the straight line model. Estimated moments of the bivariate 
normal error distribution are not reported. 
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Absolute p Relative p/p 
.>.y. (3 >.y ·a >.y . (3 >.y · a  
>.y/>.x Trade# Constant R2 >.y/ >.x Trade# Constant IJ,2 
7 /13/98ccw . 0 .02 -27.74 195 .46 0 .078 0.22 0 . 19 19. 10 0.015 
9 .48 - 1 . 18 18 .69 6 .82 0.03 9 .00 
1 1/24/98ccw 0.00 157.77 1 19.92 0.016 0.04 8 .25 13.69 0.013 
0.72 1 .67 2.49 2 .42 1 .34 5 . 10 
1/12/99ccw 0.00 24.4. 15 .46 0 .019 0 .00 1 .05 0.72 0.013 
2 .90 2 .98 5 .58 4 .37 2 .62 5 .93 
1/22/99ccw 0 .00 -5.65 17.68 0.002 0 .00 -2.08 2.44 0 .002 
1.94 -0.46 2.45 1 .84 - 1 .76 2 .21 
2/�9/99ccw -0.03 6 .43 20.61 0 .005 -0 .04 0 .26 0.83 0.006 
- 1 .05 0 .33 2 . 17 -0.94 0.41 2 .49 
5/1 1/99ccw 0.05 56.52 52.91 0 .026 0 .26 3.50 3 .24 0.039 
4.22 3 . 12 6 .77 7. 1 3 3 . 18 7.03 
4/19/99cw -0.01 -19.6 32.35 0.006 0.00 -0.72 1 . 51  0.001 
-0.45 -1 .29 3 . 12 -0.44 - 1 . 1 5  2 .82 
4/20/99cw 0.00 34. 15 154.67 0.005 0 .00 8 .68 3 .90 0.001 
0.49 0.27 2.99 0 .07 0 .91 1 .80 
4/12/99conv -0.01 4721 .64 965 . 19 0.008 -0.02 164.35 101 .97 0.008 
- 1 .73 2 .21 1 . 10 - 1 .92 1 .92 2 .93 
4/14/99conv 0.00 4875.48 3938.5_6 0 .001 0 .00 -138.26 429.28 0.001 
0.23 0 .51 1 .22 0.90 -0.32 2 .29 
Table 5 :  Prais-Winsten least squares estimates of the Liapunov function 
model in Equation 16 on trade-to-trade data. The t-statistics are presented 
below each estimate. 
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A Appendix: Theory of Price Adj ustment 
Differential Equations of a Generalized Scarf 
Model 
This appendix proves the stability properties of the different treatments. The 
first section builds on Hirota's ( 1981)  generalization of the model in Scarf's
original ( 1960) paper to allow for different treatments. The next section
demonstrates stability and instability for different initial endowments for the 
absolute adjustment model presented in the main text. The third section 
demonstrates stability and instability for different initial endowments for the 
price-scaled adjustment model presented in the main text. The final section 
shows that the prices orbit in the direction stated in the main text. 
A.1 Notation and Setup 
This section generalizes Scarf's (1960) model of global instability in a Wal­
rasian competitive market . Scarf's economy has three commodities, say X ,
Y, and Z .  There are three types of consumers, 1 , 2, and 3 ,  who respectively
have the following utility functions and initial holdings: 
{ yl zl }mm -, - , 
Wy Wz { x2 z2 }mm -, - , 
Wx Wz { x3 y3 }mm -, - , 
Wx Wy 
where Wx > 0 ,  Wy > 0,  Wz > 0 , a 2:: 0 ,  f3 2:: 0 , / 2:: 0 ,  a+f3 :::;; 1 , f3+1 :::;; 1 , and
a + / :::;; 1 .  Individual i 's endowment of commodity j is denoted by w� , and
I t  - 1 2 3 e Wj - wj + wj + wj . 
The parameters a ,  f3 and I identify each agent's endowment. Scarf con­
sidered the case where a = 1 and f3 = / = 0. The generalization to other
initial endowments follows Hirota (1981) . However, this economy differs from
his in the normalization of prices. Hirota as well as Scarf considered prices 
where p; +p� +p; = 3 ,  so that prices were confined to a sphere. This analysis
considers the case where prices are identified by setting Pz = 1 .  
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Given this price normalization, the income functions of the consumers are 
given by 
M1 (px , Py) - Px (l - a - f3)wx + pyawy + f3wz ,  
M2 (Px , Py ) - Pxf3Wx + Py/Wy + (1 - f3 - 1)wz ,  
M3 (px , Py) PxD'.Wx + Py ( l - a - 1)wy + /Wz . 
With these incomes, the individual demand functions are given by: 
1 ( ) 
WyM1 (Px , Py) 1 ( ) _ WzM1 (Px , Py) y Px ) Py - ) z Px ) Py -PyWy + Wz PyWy + Wz 
WxM2 (Px , Py) 2 ( ) _ WzM2 (Px , Py) , z Px , Py -PxWx + Wz PxWx + Wz 
WxM3(px , Py) 3 (  ) 
WyM3(Px , Py)
, Y Px , Py = PxWx + PyWy PxWx + PyWy
and x1 (px , Py ) = y2 (px , Py ) = z3 (px , Py )  = 0. Therefore, the aggregate
excess demand functions are: 
Ex( ) 
WxM2(Px , Py) + 
WxM3(Px , Py) _ W� Px , Py � 
PxWx + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
WyM1 (px , Py) + 
WyM3 (Px , Py)
_ Wy 
PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
Ez ( ) 
WzM1 (px , Py) + 
WzM2(Px , Py) _ WzPx , Py =
PyWy + Wz PxWx + Wz 
The system is in equilibrium when there is no excess demand. This hap­
pens when 
-
Px + 1 Py + 1 Px + Py 2 
The point (Px , Py) = (wz/wx , wz/wy) is the unique equilibrium which meets
the above equations if and only if 41(1 - a - (3) - (1 - 2a) ( l - 2(3) =f. 0. The
assumption is made when appropriate. 
A.2 The Absolute Adjustment Specification 
The original specification considered by Scarf held that prices adjust in pro­
portion to excess demand. That is , the adjustment paths of prices are de­
scribed by the following system of simultaneous differential equations: 
27 
Py 
where Ax > 0 and A > 0.
A.2. 1 Instability 
AxEx (Px , Py) 
AyEy(Px , Py) 
(1 ) 
(2) 
The equilibrium described above is a stable center when a+/3 = 1 , and / =  0.
In this case, the aggregate excess demand functions are: 
Wx (Px( l - a)wx + awz) Wx (PxD'.Wx + py (l - a)wy) 
--------- + - Wx 
PxWx + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
Wy (pyaWy + (1 - a)wz) Wy (PxD'.Wx + py( l - a)wy) 
�-------- + - Wy PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy
The dynamic system of Equations (1 ) and (2) reduce to:
Px (l - a)wxWx + D'.Wz PxD'.Wx + Py (l - a)wy 1-------� + -
PxWx + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
PxWx ( l - 2a) (pyWy - Wz) 
(PxWx + Wz) (PxWx + PyWy) 
(3) 
PyD'.Wy + ( 1  - a)wz PxD'.Wx + Py ( l - a)wy -=-- "------'---- + - 1
PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
PyWy (2a - l) (pxWx - Wz)
(pyWy + Wz) (PxWx + PyWy) 
(4) 
Both Equation (3) and Equation ( 4) can be manipulated to find an ex­
pression which is equal to (1 - 2a) (PyWy - Wz) (PxWx - Wz)/ (PxWx + pywy) · 
Subtracting these two expressions gives 
0 
0 
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This equation can be integrated with respect to t to give a function which 
describes the paths along which prices adjust , the solutions to the system of 
Equations (3) and (4) . In particular, 
� (� (Px)2 - (Wz ) 2 logpx) + ;_ (� (py)2 - (Wz) 2 logpy) = C� 2 � � 2 � 
where C is the constant value of the level surface on which (Px , Pv ) lies.
The stability properties of the equilibrium can be studied by examining 
this solution to system of Equations ( 3) and ( 4) .  Define the function f : 
IR++ x IR++ --t IR by 
f(p. , p,) = ;" 0 (p.) 2 - (::)' logp.) + ;, 0 (p,) 2 - ( ::)' logp,) .
Checking the first derivatives confirms that the unique critical point of 
this system is the equilibrium posited above. 
fv (Px , Py) 
fv (Px , Pv) 
The matrix of second derivatives characterizes the stability of the equi­
librium. 
_ 
� (l + (Wz) 2 _1 )Ax Wx (Px )2 
> 0, 
� (l + (Wz) 2 _1 ) Ay Wy (Py)2 
> 0, 
fyx (Px , Py) = 0
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This gives that fxx (Px , Py)fyy (Px , Py) - fxy(Px , Py)fyx (Px , Py) > 0 .  Hence, f
is a strictly convex function which takes the global minimum at (wz/wx ,  wz/wy) · 
It also satisfies the boundary condition that f (Px , Py) ----> oo as either Px ----> 0
or Py ----> 0. The isoquants of f are therefore ellipse-like closed curves with
(wz/wx ,  wz/wy) the center. Thus, the solut�on to the system of Equations (3)
and ( 4) is a stable center, with the particular closed· orbit depending on the
initial point (Px (O) , py (O) ) . 
A . 2 . 2  Stability 
If o: = (3 = O,and I = 1 in Equations ( 1 )  and (2) , the equilibrium is globally
stable. 
In this case, the aggregate excess demand functions are: 
Hence, the price adjustment system is : 
PxWxWy WyWz --�- +  . - Wy . 
PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
(5) 
(6) 
This system is not easily integrable as in the unstable case. Its stability 
properties are demonstrated using Liapunov's Second Method (Boyce and 
DiPrima, 1992; Arrow and Hahn, 1971 ) in which an auxiliary function, a 
Liapunov function, is used to provide insight into the solution to the system 
without explicit knowledge of the solution itself. 
Let g be the real-valued function on IR++ defined by g( v) = ( v ) 3  /3 -
(k)2 v + 2 (k)3 for each v > 0 ,  where k is a positive constant. Then it takes
the minimum 0 at v = k. We can thus see that
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� (Px )3 - ( :: ) 2 Px + � ( :: ) 3 2 0 'fp, > 0
with equality if an9 only if Px = Wz/Wx , and 
. � (p,)3 - (:J p, + � (:J 2 O 'fpy >  0
with equality if and only if Py = wz/wy . 
Consider the real-valued function D on IR!+ defined by
Wx [ 1 ( )3 (Wz ) 2  2 (Wz ) 3]- - Px - - Px + - -
Ax 3 Wx 3 Wx 
+ 
Wy [� (py)3 _ (Wz) 2  Py + � (Wz ) 3] 
Ay 3 Wy 3 Wy 
for each (Px , Py) E IR!+ · Note that D(px, Py) 2: 0 for each (Px , Py) E IR!+ ,
and D(px , Py) = 0 if and only if (Px , Py ) = (wz/wx , wz/wy) · Therefore, the
following function V ( t) is a Liapunov function for the system of Equations
(5) and (6) : 
where t denotes time. 
To establish global stability, it is sufficient to show that the value of V 
decreases as t increases until (px , Py) reaches (wz/wx , wz/wy) regardless of
where (Px , Py) starts.
v 
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The sign of V is determined by 
2(PxWx _ l ) (PyWy _ l ) + (PxWx _ PyWy) 2 (PyWy + PyWy ) , Wz Wz Wz Wz Wz Wz 
For every a 2: 0, and every b 2: 0 ,
2(a - l) (b - 1 ) + (a - b)2 (a + b)  ;:::: 0,
with equality if and only if a = b = 1 . 1  
1 Here is a proof:
\Ve have 
Let k = a +  b, then
2(a - l ) (b - 1 )  + (a - b)2 (a + b)
= a3 + b3 + 2 - a2b - ab2 + 2ab - 2a - 2b.
2(a - l ) (b - 1 )  + (a - b)2 (a + b)
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Hence, V :::; 0 with equality if and only if PxWx = Wz = pywy (i .e . ,
(Px , Py) = (wz/wx , wz/wy) ) . Therefore, V(t) is strictly decreasing every­
where except at the equilibrium, so for all starting price pairs, the prices will 
converge to the equilibrium. This means the system of Equations (5) and 
(6) is globally stable. 
A.3 Relative Price Adjustment 
While microeconomists typically use the absolute price adjustment specifi­
cation considered by Scarf, macroeconomists often assume that price adjust­
ments are proportional to the price level. In this economy, this assumption 
means prices adjust according to the following simultaneous differential equa­
tions: 
a3 + (k - a)3 + 2 - a2 (k - a) - a(k - a)2 + 2a(k - a) - 2k 
(4k - 2)a2 + (2k - 4k2 )a + k3 - 2k + 2 
4(k - � ) (a - � )2 + � (k - 2)2 .
2 2 2 
Define the real-valued function h on [O, k] by 
for each a E [O, k] .
h(a) = 4(k - � ) (a - �)2  + � ( k  - 2) 2
2 2 2 
(i) If 0 :=:; k < 1/2,  then f takes the minimum k3 - 2k + 2 at a = 0 and a = k .
Since 0 S k < 1/2,  the derivative 3k2 - 2 is  negative and the infimum of k3 - 2k + 2
is ( 1 /2)3 - 2 ( 1 /2) + 2 > 0, so that k3 - 2k + 2 > 0. Hence, for each a E [O, k] , 
h(a) ?. k3 - 2k + 2 ?. (�r - 2 (�) + 2 > 0.
. 
(ii )  If k =-1./2, then for each a E [O, k] ,
1 ( 3) 2 h(a) = 2 2 > 0.
(iii) If k > 1/2,  then f takes the minimum (k - 2)2 /2 at a =  k/2. Note that (k - 2)2 /2 ?_
0 with equality if and only if k = 2. Since a =  k/2, we have 
k = 2 if and only if a = 1 = b.
By (i) ,  (ii ) ,  and (iii ) ,  we complete the proof. 
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where Ax > 0 and Ay > 0.
A.3.1 Instability
Py ( ) = . AyEY Px , Py 
Py 
(7) 
(8) 
As with the absolute specification, the system of Equations (7) and (8) is
globally unstable if a +  f3 = 1 ,  and / = 0 .
Following the same method to integrate the system as in the absolute
adjustment specification, the system can be written 
Py 
Px (l - a)wx + CYWz PxCYWx + Py (l - a)wy l------- + -
PxWx + W z PxWx + PyWy 
PxWx (l - 2a) (pyWy - Wz) 
(PxWx + Wz) (PxWx + PyWy) 
PyCYWy + ( 1  - a)wz PxCYWx + Py(l - a)wy ----"--------'----- + - 1 
PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
PyWy(2a - l) (pxWx - Wz) 
(pyWy + Wz) (PxWx + PyWy) . 
(9) 
( 10) 
Both Equation (9) and Equation (10) can be manipulated to find an 
expression. which is equal to ( 1  - 2a) (PyWy - Wz) (PxWx - Wz)/ (PxWx + pywy) · 
Subtracting these two expressions gives 
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0 
0 
This equation can be directly integrated with respect to t to give a func­
tion which describes the paths along which prices adjust , the solution to the 
system of Equations (9) and (10) . In particular, 
( ( )
2 ) ( ( )
2 )1 Wz 1 1 Wz 1 
- p + - - + - p + - -Ax 
x Wx Px . Ay 
y Wy Py 
= c 
where C is the constant value of the level surface on which (Px , Py )  lies.
The stability properties of the equilibrium can be studied by examining 
this solution to the system of Equations (9) and ( 10) . Define the function
f : IR++ x IR++ --+ IR by 
f(p, , p,) � :. (Px + (::)' :. ) + :, (p, + (:J :J · 
Checking the first derivatives confirms that the unique critical point of 
this system is the equilibrium posited above. 
fx (Px , Py) 
fx (Px , Py) 
fy (Px , Py) 
fy (Px , Py) 
Wz0 ¢:? Px = -Wx
Wz 0 ¢:? Py = -Wy 
The matrix of second derivatives characterizes the stability of the equi­
librium. 
2 (Wz ) 2
Ax (Px)3 Wx 
> 0
2 (Wz )
2 
Ay(Py)3 Wy 
> 0 ,
fyx (Px , Py) = 0
35 
Since fxx (Px , Py)fyy (Px , Py) - fxy (Px , Py)fyx (Px , Py) > 0, f is a strictly con­
vex function which takes the global minimum at (wz/wx , wz/wy) · It also
satisfies the boundary condition that f(Px , Py) ---+ oo as either Px ---+ 0 or
Py ---+ 0. The isoquants of f are therefore ellipse-like closed curves with
(wz/wx , Wz/wy) the center. Thus, the solution to the system of Equations (9)
and (10) is a stable center, with the particular closed orbit depending on the
initial point (Px (O) , py(O)) .-
A.3 .2 Stability 
If a =  f3 = O,and I =  1 in Equations (7) and (8) , the equilibrium is globally
stable. 
In this case, the aggregate excess demand functions are: 
PyWxWy WxWz d --'-----'--- + - wx ; an 
PxWx + Wz PxWx + PyWy
PxWxWy WyWz ---- + - Wy . PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
Hence, the price adjustment system is : 
Px
Px
Py _ \ [ PxWxWy WyWz l - Ay + - Wy . Py PyWy + Wz PxWx + PyWy 
( 1 1) 
( 12) 
As in the absolute adjustment specification, this system is not as easily 
integrable as the unstable case, so its stability properties are demonstrated 
using Liapunov's Second Method.  
Let g be the real-valued function on lR++ defined by g( v) = ! ( v ) 2 -
(k )2 log v for each v > 0, where k is a positive constant . Then it takes the
minimum ! (k)2 - (k)2 log k at v = k. We can thus see that ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 2 Wz 1 Wz Wz Wz - (Px) - - logpx 2: - - - - log -2 Wx 2 Wx Wx Wx 
with equality if and only if Px = wz/wx , and 
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( )
2 ( )
2 ( )
2 ( )
1 2 Wz 1 Wz Wz Wz - (Py) - - log Py 2 - - - - log -2 Wy 2 Wy Wy Wy 
. with equality if and only if Py = Wz/Wy · Consider the real-valued function
D on �!+ defined by 
�: [ ( � �.)' _ (�:)' logp, ) - ( H�:)' - (::)' log (�:) ) ]
<: [ (� (p,)2 - (�J logp, ) - ( H�J � (�J log (�:) ) ] 
for each (Px , Py) E �!+ · Note that D(px , Py) 2 0 for each (Px , Py) E �!+ , 
and D(px , Py) = 0 if and only if (Px , Py) = (wz/Wx , wz/wy) · Therefore, the
following function V ( t) is a Liapunov function for the system of Equations 
( 1 1 )  and ( 12) :  
V ( t) D (Px ( t) , Py ( t) )  
�: [ U (p, (t))2 - (�J logp, (t) ) - ( H�:)' - (�:)' log (�:) ) J 
+ �: [ (� �,(t) )2 - (�J logp,(t) ) - 0 (�:)' - (�J log (�:) ) ]
where t denotes time. 
To establish global stability, it is sufficient to show that the value of V 
decreases as t increases until (Px ,  Py ) reaches (wz/wx ,  wz/wy )  regardless of
where (px , Py) starts. The first derivative is given by
v 
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The sign of V is determined by 
2(PxWx - l ) (Py
Wy 
_ l ) + (PxWx _ PyWy) 2 (PyWy + PyWy ) . Wz Wz Wz Wz Wz Wz 
For every a 2 0, and every b 2 0, 
2(a - l ) (b - 1) + (a - b)2 (a + b) 2 0 ,  
with equality i f  and only i f  a = b = 1 .  Hence, V :::; 0 with equality i f  and 
only if p;wx = Wz = PyWy (i .e . ,  (Px , Py) = (wz/Wx , Wz/wy) ) . Therefore, V(t) 
is strictly decreasing everywhere except at the equilibrium, so for all starting 
price pairs, the prices will converge to equilibrium. This means that the 
system of Equations (1 1 ) and (12) is globally stable. 
A.4 Directions of the Limit Cycles 
Having established that Scarf's model predicts prices will orbit around the 
competitive equilibrium when / = 0, this section considers the direction 
·around the orbits in which prices move. 
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For all a +  f3 = 1 ,  Px moves according to Equation (3) in the absolute
adjustment model and Equation (9) in the relative adjustment models. Since 
endowments must be nonnegative and prices and Ax must be positive, the
sign of both equations is determined by 
( 13) 
The second term is zero when Py = wz/wy ; it is positive- when Py is above
the equilibrium price, and negative if Py is below the equilibrium price. The 
first term is positive when a < � .  Therefore, when a < � ,  Px is increasing
when Py is above the equilibrium price and negative when Px is below the 
equilibrium price. The direction of adjustment reverses when a >  � and the
sign of the first term changes. 
For all a +  f3 = 1 , Py moves according to Equation ( 4) in the absolute ad­
justment model and Equation (10) in the relative adjustment models. Since 
endowments must be nonnegative and prices and Ax must be positive, the
sign of both equations is determined by 
(14) 
The second term is zero when Px = wz/wx ; it is positive when Px is above
the equilibrium price, and negative if Px is below the equilibrium price. The 
first term is positive when a > � .  Therefore, when a > � ,  Py is increasing
when Px is above the equilibrium price and negative when Py is below the
equilibrium price. The direction of adjustment reverses when a < � and the
sign of the first term changes. 
In the counterclockwise treatment , where a = 1 ,  these results combine
to indicate a counterclockwise orbit. The price space can be divided into 
quadrants, split by the line Px = wz/wx and the line Py = wz/wy . In the
quadrant where Px < Wz/Wx and Py < Wz/wy , Px is inc�easing and Py is
decreasing; where Px < Wz/Wx and Py > wz/wy , Px is decreasing and Py
is decreasing; where Px > wz/Wx and Py < Wz/wy , Px is increasing and Py
is increasing; where Px > wz/wx and Py > wz/wy , Px is decreasing and Py
is increasing. This pattern establishes the prices are adjusting around the 
orbits in a counterclockwise direction. That the prices orbit clockwise when 
a = 0 follows symmetrically.
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Fig ure 1 a: Sample Convergence Paths (A.=1 ) 
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Figure 2b:  5/1 1 /99 CCW-Experienced
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Figure 3a: Cou nterclockwise Experiments 
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1 Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The 
instructions are simple ,  and if you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid 
. to you in cash. Jn this experiment , we are going to conduct a market in which 
you will make decisions to_ buy, sell or hoid tl;iree _different "commodities ,"  
called X, Y and "francs" in a sequence of trading periods. Attached to 
the instructions you will find a sheet labeled "Payoff Table" which will help 
determine the value to you of any decisions you might make. YOU ARE NOT 
TO REVEAL THE INFORMATION ON THIS SHEET TO ANYONE. It is 
your own private information. 
Commodity X is traded in market X, and commodity Y is traded in 
market Y. The currency used in these two markets is the third commodity, 
francs. All prices are quoted in terms of francs. Your final payoff, how­
ever, will be in terms of dollars, which depends upon your end of period 
"inventories" of X and Y, and your inventory of francs, listed as "cash on 
hand .. " 
1 . 1  The Payoff Tables
You will find a table labeled "PAYOFF TABLE" in your folder. You will also 
find a figure representation of the table. Your dollar payoff is determined at 
the end of each period by the number of units of X, Y, and francs that you 
hold as inventory at the end of a period. The dollar amounts can depend 
upon all three. In some cases the value is determined by two of the variables 
and the value of the third commodity can be added to the value created by 
the other two. It is important to note the .third commodity might have no 
value at all, in which case you may not want to hold any of it if you can 
trade it for something of value. 
The values listed in the following EXAMPLE payoff table generally have 
nothing to do with the values in your actual payoff tables, but they should 
help you read the actual table. In the EXAMPLE TABLE, values depend 
upon the final holding of only two of the commodities o:, f3 while the third, / ,
is worth nothing. Of course o: and /3 can be any pair of the three commodities
(X, Y and francs) . Suppose that you have decided to hold 8 units of o:, 14 
units of /3, and 4 units of /· Your dollar payoff in this case is determined 
as follows. Notice first that the 4 units of the third commodity are worth 
1 
nothing in this case, so these units contribute nothing to your dollar payoff. 
Now, find the row corresponding to 8 units of a and the column corresponding
to 14 units of /3. Read the entry for the total payoff, 800. This would be 
your dollar payoff for that period. If you held 9 units of a and 14  units of /3,
your total payoff would be 1200 instead of 800. 
· The value per units of 'Y is listed at the bottom of the table. If this is not 
zero, then it should be added to the computations from the_ table to get your 
period payoff. 
In some payoff tables, the payoffs are not continuous. Namely, it might 
take several units of a commodity to reach a higher level of payment. That is, 
the payoff chart requires that the full number of units be achieved 
before the higher payoff is attained and units that fall short of 
that might add nothing to your payoff. The interval payoffs indicate 
the effect on your payoff of a one-interval change in holdings. For example,
given 14 units of /3, the 8th unit of a adds nothing to your payoff but the gth
adds 400 ( = 1200 - 800) to your payoff.
The RECORD SHEET is filled out as follows. Suppose that 8 units of a,
14 units of /3, and 4 units of g are held. Suppose further that a represents
X, j3 represents Y ,  and 'Y is francs. Column 1 would show 4 francs inventory 
holding (cash on hand) . Column 2 would show 8 units of X inventory holding, 
and column 3 would show 14 units of Y inventory holding. Column 4 would 
show a payoff of 800 for the period. 
The figure attached after your payoff table is a graphical representation of 
the table . For the EXAMPLE, the units of a are on the horizontal axis, the
units of j3 are on the vertical axis, and the units of 'Y are shown at the bottom 
of the figure. The value shown there would be added to the value computed 
f.rom the figure for the other two. Of course, if the third commodity were 
worth nothing to you, then holding it would add nothing to your total. 
1. 2 Endowments
At the beginning of each period of the experiment , you will be given a one 
time endowment of [ ] francs cash on hand, [ ] units of X, and [ ]
units of Y. You can see them on your screen. 
2 
1.3 How the System Works 
In order to buy anything, you must have enough cash in francs on hand. 
Unless you are endowed with francs at the beginning of the period ,  you can 
only acquire francs by selling something. You must sell one thing in order 
t.o get the francs to buy the other. If you do not have enough cash to buy 
units in market X, you must then sell some of your units in market Y in 
order to obtain cash to buy in market X. How many units of commodities 
an individual would want to sell or how many units of francs the individual
would want to retain depends upon the individual. 
1.4 Time and the End of the Experiment 
The market system is organized as follows. The market will open in a series 
of trading periods, each of which lasts for [ ] minutes. The last period will
be announced after it has closed. 
1 .  5 Some Notes 
No talking; 
No "flashing" (i .e . , rapid cancellation) ;
No advantage to grabbing typos; 
Beware of "sliding" (i .e . ,  low bids (high asks) when sellers (buyers) are rapidly
accepting) ; 
Beware of "switching" (e.g. , bids of 1 for 5 units when people have been
bidding 5 for 1 unit) . 
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17 - 20 1200 1200 
13 - 16 800 800 
9 - 1 2  600 600 
5 - 8 200 600 
1 - 4  200 200 
0 0 200 
f3 I a 0 1 - 4 
- 1200 1200 1400 1400 
800 . 1200 1200 1400 
800 800 1200 1200 
600 800 800 1200 
600 600 800 1200 
200 600 800 1200 
5 - 8 9 - 1 2  13 - 1 6  1 7  - 20 
(value of / ) = 0 per unit
Table 1 : .  Payoff Table 
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Figure B . 1 :  Graphical representation of the Payoff Table . 
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